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Since 1992, China's small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) have 
conducted a series of radical and successful restructuring in their ownership 
and governance arrangements. This paper focuses on the ownership restruc-
ture of township-village enterprises {TVEs) and private-household enter-
prises in the 1990s and examines the incentive-based reasons for the antici-
patory restructuring in the absence of crisis in these two sectors. It highlights 
how market and inter-jurisdictional competitions have induced ownership 
reforms and how the organization of government matters in providing gov-
ernment itself with incentives for reform. It also explores the implications of 
China 's SME ownership evolution for SME development in Russia and other 
former Soviet Union economies. 
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Robert Mcintyre, Robert Stuart and an anonymous referee of this Journal for helpful 
comments and advice. 
49 
50 SUN 
1. Introduction 
Since 1992, China's small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in all 
sectors of the state, township-village, and private have conducted a series of 
radical and successful reforms of their ownership and governance structures. 
An innovative arrangement, joint-stock cooperative with variations across 
regions and industries, has become widespread, supplemented by traditional 
measures such as selling, leasing, taking over, merging, and restructuring 
through Sino-foreign joint venture and corporatization. 
Following the historical administrative classification, SMEs in China can 
be classified into two large categories of the "rural" and "urban", as indicated 
in Table 1. Rural SMEs include almost all township and village enterprises with 
dominate community ownership (TVEs) and all of rural household and private 
enterprises. They together have produced about one-third of China's GDP 
since 1996 and employed over 130 million rural workers. Urban SMEs include 
small and medium-sized state-owned enterprises (SO Es), urban collective en-
terprises, urban household and private firms, and other ownership forms, mainly 
joint-ventures. These urban firms produced about another one-third of China's 
GDP and employed 115 million urban workers. In the urban SME sector, SO Es 
account for about half of both the value-added and employment. The signifi-
cant position of SMEs in China suggests that the ownership restructure of 
these locally controlled SMEs in the 1990s would bring fundamental changes 
to China's economic system. 
The State-Owned SME Sector. In the state sector, the ownership reform 
centers on restructuring state-owned SMEs into limited liability companies, 
joint-stock coorperatives,jointventures with foreign companies and with other 
domestic ownership forms, and management-employee buyouts. The methods 
of sales, leasing, and bankruptcy are also employed. The reform has been once 
again initiated and led by local governments, mainly, by counties and cities 
with a prefectural- or county-rank within the administrative hierarchy. Since 
the early 1970s these county and city governments have come to control all 
small and a large proportion of medium-sized SOEs. Different from the situation 
in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the size distribution of SO Es in 
China is skewed toward the small and medium ones, and furthermore the distri-
bution is spread across the country (Qian and Xu 1993). Therefore, ownership 
restructuring of these locally controlled SO Es is equally as significant as the 
restructuring of the large ones that are controlled by the central government. 
As analyzed in details in Sun(1997), Cao et al. (1999) and Gu (1999), SME 
ownership reform in the state sector is best seen as a relatively passive re-
sponse to the pressing financial and business difficulties faced by the state 
SMEs and local governments. County and prefectural SOEs have typically 
been the most inefficient ones. They are often too small to apply economies of 
scale, but too bureaucratic to be able to exploit the advantage of their small size 
as TVEs usually can. Finding a way to get rid of the increasing burden of 
bailing local SO Es out has been the number one headache for most county and 
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Table 1: 
The Category and Significance of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) in China 
Ownership Value-added Employment Assets 
Rural SMEs 33% National GDP since 1996 130.5 million, 1997 2, 112.6 billion yuan, 1998 
• TVEs (community ownership domination) • 54% (in 1996) • 50.7% 
• Household and private enterprises • 46% (in 1996) • 49.3% 
Urban SMEs 63. 7% urban GDP in 1994 62.6% urban employment 45.6% of the urban 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Small and medium-sized SOEs • 50% • 47.2% 
Collectively owned enterprises • 31.2% 
Household and private enterprises 
• 50% • 14.8% 
Others • 6.8% 
Sources: Statistical Yearbook of China (Yearbook, hereafter) 1998, pp. 130-31, 421-24. Yearbook of China's Township and Village 
Enterprises (TVE Yearbook, hereafter) 1997, pp. 121-122. Li and Wei (1996, pp. 4-5). People's Daily, February 19, 1997; February 28, 
1998; July 17and20, 1999. 
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prefectural governments. Once obtaining support from the central govern-
ment, local governments have strong incentives to implement these radical 
ownership reform measures. 
The Township and Village Enterprise (TVE) Sector. In contrast to the 
situation in the SOE sector, ownership reform in the TVE sector is an active 
response to potential or foreseeable difficulties TVEs may confront in the near 
future. During 1992-1999, the TVE sector continued its growth miracle of the 
1980s. The real growth rate ofTVE value added was 22 percent per annum at 
average during 1992-97. In 1998 and the firsthalfofl999, this growth rate was 
still over 15 percent despite of the negative impact of deflation and East Asian 
economic crisis. The export performance ofTVEs has been more impressive. 
The value of export goods delivery increased from US$2 l. 7 billion in 1992 to 
US$84.6 billion in 1997 and the TVE share in total national exports rose from 
25.5percentin1992 to46.3 percent in 1997. Since 1995, industrial TVEs have 
produced more than 3 0 percent of the national totals of industrial value-added, 
profits, and output; the TVE sector as a whole has created more than 16 per-
cent of China's GDP. 1 
There has been a large body ofliterature to explicate the nature ofTVE 
ownership and governance structures and the factors leading to the TVE miracle. 
As summarized in a very recent TVE literature survey in this Journal (Perotti, et 
al. 1999), The major factors accounting for TVE success include: (a) Hard 
budget constraints to TVEs in general and to each township and village com-
munity in particular. (b) Relatively compatible interests and incentives within a 
TVE community, constantly reinforced by competitive pressures from markets 
and other communities. ( c) Flexibility due to small size, diversified community 
economy, and far from strict bureaucratic control, which give TVEs an advan-
tage to capture opportunities emerging in all markets of products, labor, capi-
tal, and the domestic and international. And ( d) simpler principal-agent tier, 
personnel and employment system, and labor relations, which are induced by 
the historical institutional arrangements in rural China and subject to the ad-
justments required by competition. However, as correctly pointed out by Chen 
(2000, p. 10), the literature typically treats TVE property rights structure as 
static and there is a lack of explicit explanation about how this structure adapts 
to the rapidly changing environment and emerging institutional alternations. 
In this paper we raise and partly answer the following questions: Why 
did TVEs, the creators of the TVE miracle, have the interests to reform them-
selves in the absence of crisis? What has motivated the township and village 
governments to give up a large set of their de facto ownership and control 
rights over their TVEs? What incentives are confronted by the TVE managers 
and workers in the reform process? What are the consequences of the reform, 
in terms of economic performance, the relationship between community gov-
ernments and TVEs, labor-management relations, and most importantly, own-
ership and governance structures? 
The Private and Household-run Enterprise Sector. This sector has ex-
perienced very rapid growth since 1992, thanks to the needed improvements in 
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the ideological environment and concrete policy treatment following the re-
newed impulse for ref01m. The number of private firms increased from 13 9 ,000 
in 1992 to 961,000in1997, of which about60percentare in theurban areas and 
the remaining 40 percent in the rural areas, and their average employment size 
dropped slightly from 17 in 1992 to 14 in 1997. The number of household-run 
firms rose from 15.3 million in 1992 to 28.5 million in 1997, of which about 65 
percent are in the rural areas. Of the total number of private and household-run 
firms, more than half have engaged in wholesale and retail trade and in catering 
services, and about 20 percent are industrial firms. From 1992 to 1997, the share 
of these industrial firms in the national total industrial output increased from 
about6 percentto 18 percent (Yearbook 1993: 113-14, 409, 590; 1998: 152-53, 
431-33,581). 
Two specific features of this sector are of great interest to research. First, 
production firms in this sector, especially those in rural areas, have operated in 
tandem with community authorities such as village governments and with 
community-run TVEs. Second, an increasing number of these production firms 
are adopting the ownership form of joint-stock cooperative and some of them 
have grown out of joint-stock cooperatives and become limited liability com-
panies. An interest question arises here as well: Why do these small private 
firms prefer "cooperation" when their legal status as purely private entities has 
been constitutionally recognized and the policy discriminations against them 
have been substantially diminished? 
This paper mainly focuses on the ownership restructures in the TVE and 
private-household enterprise sectors. It reveals the incentive-based reasons 
for these anticipatory reforms in the absence of crisis, and highlights how the 
organization of government matters in providing government itself with incen-
tives for reform. The existing theories on government-owned firms and 
privatization cannot answer this question (Qian and Roland 1998). To obtain 
new insights into the discussion, our thinking about ownership reform should 
go beyond the general property rights theory, and furthermore we should 
integrate the property right theory with the double perspectives that competi-
tion can induce ownership reform and that organizational and social capital are 
crucial for the transition. 
We argue that the SME ownership reform has been induced by both 
market and inter-jurisdictional competitions. While the role of market competi-
tion is sufficiently emphasized in the transition literature, the significance of 
inter-jurisdictional competition has not been fully explored. We stress the im-
portance of organizational and social capital and claim that whether govern-
ments in the transition economies functioning as a market promoter or a rent 
grabber generates essentially different consequences. In other words, when 
transition has started in an environment where there is a lack of independent 
market intermediaries and dispute settling institutions, local governments are 
usually the only available institutions with the capability to mediate transac-
tions and with the authority to settle disputes. Under these circumstances, a 
proper transformation of the role of government from a rent grabber to a market 
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promoter is critical for the emergence and development of professional market 
intermediaries and dispute settling institutions, and thus for the success of 
transition. On the other hand, competition, particularly inter-jurisdictional com-
petition, can induce and prompt the proper transformation of the role of gov-
ernment. 
Competition can induce ownership restructuring; the existing organiza-
tional and social capital matters and can make positive contributions to the 
transition; and inter-jurisdictional competition prompts the proper transforma-
tion of the role of government. These three points may be the fundamental 
lessons that the anticipatory reform of China's SMEs has offered. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a theoretical dis-
cussion of the interaction between competition and ownership restructuring, 
with an emphasis on the role of inter-jurisdictional competition among local 
governments. Section 3 discusses why TVEs need ownership reform in the 
absence of crisis. It reveals the emerging debt problems faced by TVEs and 
their urgent need for capitalization. Section 4 presents the stylized features of 
the joint-stock cooperatives emerging in the TVE sector. Section 5 shows an 
illustrative model of ownership evolution of the private sector in the context of 
China, and analyzes the incentives for private entrepreneurs to adopt joint-
stock cooperatives. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper and explores the 
general implications of China's SME ownership evolution for SME develop-
ment in Russia and other former Soviet Union economies. 
2. Two Forms of Competition and Ownership Restructuring 
Competition as Rivalry Behavior 
The close link between imitative output competition and the allocation 
efficiency of resources has been well established in neo-classical economics. 
In the perfect competition model, each firm takes the prices given to it by the 
mysterious market clearing forces in the market, and competes with others by 
offering output, especially by offering output through entry. The market reaches 
equilibrium if neither insiders nor outsiders have an interest in changing the 
quantity they supply to the market, and the perfectly competitive equilibrium 
obtained is Pareto optimum. In this set-up, competition is nothing more or less 
than the undertaking of profitable imitative output responses to given market 
prices (Demsetz 1997: 137-138). 
In terms of everyday meaning of the word, the notion of competition 
goes far beyond the narrow one of imitative output competition and has much 
broader implication than that of allocation efficiency. Competition is popularly 
viewed as rivalry behaviour and the leading driving force of the Schumpeterian 
creative destruction. Competition leads firms and organizations internally more 
efficient by sharpening incentives to avoid sloth and slack. Competition re-
sults in efficient organisations to prosper at the expense of inefficient ones and 
this selection process is good for aggregate efficiency. Competition induces 
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innovations in all areas of technology, organisation, and institutions, which 
has been the major source of gains in productive efficiency (Stigler, 1987; 
Vickers, 1995). Since the rivalry behaviour view of competition follows the 
tradition of Hayek and Schumpeter and pays main attention to productive and 
dynamic efficiency, it is more relevant to our study of the evolutionary dynam-
ics of firms in transition economies. 
Inter-jurisdictional Competition 
In the transitional China, apart from the market competition that has put 
pressure on and stimulated efforts of firms and local governments, the inter-
jurisdictional competition across provinces, cities, counties, and rural commu-
nities (i.e. township and villages) has played perhaps a more important role in 
the areas of promoting markets, stimulating reform initiatives and inducing 
ownership restructuring (Montinola, et al. 1995; Qian and Roland, 1998; Qian 
and Weingast 1997). 
First, inter-jurisdictional competition induces local governments to pro-
vide a hospitable environment for attracting scarce production factors such as 
capital and skilled labour. Local governments are induced to establish a basis 
for secure rights of factor owners, to provide infrastructure, utilities, and ac-
cess to markets. Becaus_e those jurisdictions that fail to provide these local 
public goods find that the urgently needed factors move to other jurisdictions, · 
and consequently, this causes their local economic activities and tax revenues 
to stagnate or even decline (Montinola et al. 1995). 
Second, inter-jurisdictional competition induces the endogenous emer-
gence of harder budget constraints for lower level governments. Although the 
mobility of already existing "stock" resources may be limited in China, the 
mobility of incremental resources in general and non-state capital investment 
in particular raises the opportunity costs to local governments of bailing out 
inefficient finns or spending on wasteful public consumption (Jefferson 1998; 
Qian and Roland 1998). Local governments that persistently make inefficient 
expenditures will not only fail to attract investment and skilled labor to their 
jurisdictions but also find that their own resources and skilled labor have 
moved away from their jurisdictions. As a consequence, competition endog-
enously hardens budget constraint oflower level governments given the lim-
ited capacity of the higher level governments to provide fiscal subsidies (Qian 
and Weingast 1997). 
Third, inter-jurisdictional competition helps limit government's preda-
tory behavior against local firms . Furthermore, it leads to a reduction of restric-
tions on local firms and induces the local governments to look for better own-
ership and governance structures for their fmns . When a particular local gov-
ernment insists on imposing an onerous restriction on its local fmns, fmns in 
this jurisdiction are confronted with a competitive disadvantage compared 
with competing finns from other jurisdictions that are not bound by the restric-
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tion (Montinola et al. 1995). These competition-induced effects are certainly 
market-promoting and reform-oriented. 
Once our understanding of competition extends to the inclusion of inter-
jurisdictional competition among local governments, we can better understand 
why the pace and outcomes of reform in China have to a great extent deter-
mined by the competition specific to localities and enterprises. Market compe-
tition was introduced and gradually enhanced by opening the state monopo-
lized industrial sector to new entrants and by the consequent TVE miracle. The 
inter-jurisdictional competition was put in place by the revenue-sharing con-
tract between central and provincial governments and between provincial and 
city or county governments. The revenue-sharing contract system introduced 
in the early years of reform was likened as "eating in your own kitchens" 
fenzao chifan). It delegated the basic responsibility of balancing local rev-
enue and expenditure to local governments. 
Competition Can Induce Ownership Restructuring 
Confronted with an increasingly competitive environment, profits are 
much more sensitive to the competitive ability of firms. Low or declining profits 
lead directly to low or declining bonuses and fringe benefits, poor reputations, 
and even to survival crises, thus motivating enterprise managers and employ-
ees to seek alternatives that enhance their competitive position. Among local 
governments, particularly those at lower levels with fewer enterprises under 
their jurisdictions, the erosion of enterprise profits that are the major source of 
local revenues, causes immediate fiscal distress. This distress alone may de-
stabilize the distribution of fiscal revenues among regions and administrative 
organs, hurt the reputations of local officials and reduce the bonuses and 
benefits of local government employees. In order to generate more revenue 
and reduce expenditure pressure, local governments are induced to reform 
their local enterprises rather than continuously to bail out inefficient firms. It is 
in this sense we claim that competition induces enterprise reform and owner-
ship restructuring. 
By the mid- l 990s, competition had gradually exhausted the monopoly 
profits of most state-owned industries, the traditional primary sources of gov-
ernment revenues. According to a World Bank (1997) report, about halfof the 
industrial SOEs made a loss in 1996, up from one-third just two year earlier. 
Among loss-making SO Es about 90 percent were small ones controlled by city 
and county governments (Zhou and Shen 1997). One simple reason for this is 
that small SO Es hold too small a market share to seize monopoly profits longer. 
As a consequence, the most radical ownership reform seemed inevitable for 
small SO Es by the mid- l 990s. 
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Ownership Restructuring Improves the Framework for 
Competition: A Virtuous Circle 
Competition induces ownership restructuring and at the same time, own-
ership restructuring induced by competition further improves the framework 
for competition and opens up more areas to competition. In the 1980s, the 
reassignment of SOE property rights and increased SOE autonomy not only 
enhanced entrepreneurial responses to market-determined supply and demand 
signals, but also extended product markets from the secondary component to 
the dominant one in the dual track economy with both planned and market 
components. SOE property rights reform and TVE development further led to 
the emergence of capital and labor markets (Sun 1997). The role of govern-
ments was transformed as well from the direct management of SOEs to one 
more like that of a market intermediary. While the independent market interme-
diaries are largely absent in a transition economy like China (Stiglitz 1999), the 
role played by governments, particularly lower level governments, in mediat-
ing transactions and resolving disputes is of fundamental importance for both 
development and transition. While an attention must be paid to the negative 
effect of such government-business collusion, it is also worth noting that in 
the context of China the in~ensive inter-jurisdictional competition seems to 
have kept thiS collusion in check while generating positive net benefits (Li 
1998). 
The ownership restructuring conducted since 1992 has prompted fur-
ther a functional transformation of the role of the governments at various 
levels. In those cities and counties where most of enterprises have waved 
farewell to de facto government ownership, the local governments have started 
to function more like a market regulator, although they have continued to 
mediate transactions and resolve disputes. Government assets are managed in 
the forms of share holding and venture capitals. This progress has improved 
and is likely to continue to improve the framework for market competition. 
3. Why TVEs Need Ownership Restructure 
"Township and village enterprise" (TVE) is a Chinese specific term to 
identify those firms that are initially collectively owned by a rural community 
such as a township or village and later on closely association with the commu-
nity. This term has increasingly become an administrative and historical icon 
rather than economic one. But it is a key concept for our understanding of 
China's impressive economic growth since the late 1970s. 
The TVE phenomenon is unique in the sense that the emergence of rural 
entrepreneurs and enterprises has not been experienced in any other country 
on such a large scale and at such a rapid rate. Its roots can be traced back to the 
late 1950s, but its development was not truly noticeable until the late 1970s 
when China began to carry out reforms and to open up to the outside world. 
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The TVE development so far is not an outcome of any carefully designed 
policy or plan. The government policy changed from tolerance to encourage-
ment during the 1980s, only after recognizing that the TVE was a vehicle to 
increase rural income, and more importantly, to absorb a large amount of sur-
plus rural labor force without much need for state investment. 
As shown in Section 1, the TYE miracle of the 1980s has continued in the 
1990s. However, it is worth noting that the initially favorable market and envi-
ronmental conditions enjoyed by TVEs have gradually dissolved since the late 
1980s. Moreover, following the expansion ofTVE scale and market shares, TVE 
mechanism degeneration has become increasingly serious in those township 
and villages where grassroots democratization has lagged behind, due to the 
lack of mechanism to inhibit opportunistic behaviors of those increasingly 
powerful local officials. 
Mechanism Degeneration: The Most Widely Reported Reason 
The so called "mechanism degeneration" of TVEs has been widely re-
ported since the early 1990s (cf. Ren et al. 1990; China Information Daily, 
August 2, 1993; Ministry of Agriculture 1997). Many aspects of mechanism 
degeneration have been linked to the problems inherent in TVE ownership and 
governance structures. Among them, two are often pointed out. 
First, township or village governments are not purely economic actors. 
As TVEs mature, the objectives of community government officials are coming 
increasingly into conflict with those ofTVE managers, although initially these 
two sets of objectives were quite similar (Wang 1990; Shi and You 1997). Com-
munity governments have assigned priority to raising employment, local pros-
perity and financial revenue. This could conflict with the efficiency require-
ment of individual TVEs, impose SOE-similar mechanisms to TVEs and thus 
hinder the stable, long-term development ofTVEs. The powerful control rights 
of community governments could thus lead to unfavorable interference into 
TVE management. Community governments also seem to be shifting the re-
sponsibility for the overall development of their communities onto individual 
TVEs. As a result, many TVEs are also experiencing redundant employment 
and increasingly heavy social burden, become quite similar to SO Es in many 
ways, and have strong desire for reform (Byrd and Lin 1990: 125, 304 and 351; 
Shi and You 1997; Xu and Zhang 1997). 
Second, bureaucratization and corruption among community officials 
and TVE managers are growing in many communities. In those communities 
where the development of grassroots democratization has lagged behind, the 
problem of who monitors the monitors becomes increasingly serious. This is 
because there is a lack of effective restraint devices to curb corrupt behavior of 
those increasingly powerful local officials. For example, many TVEs are becom-
ing "purses" of their community governments, required to pay many sorts of 
expenses for the government; and many TVE managers are stripping TVE 
assets for their own uses (Shi and You, 1997). 
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Although there has been supervisions from county governments as 
highlighted in Che and Qian (1998), this kind of monitoring may be limited due 
to the problem of information asymmetry. The restraints from county govern-
ments are mainly based on the discipline of the Communist Party. This may not 
make sense for most officials at grassroots level, because the probability that 
they will be promoted to the status of a formal bureaucrat is small. Indeed, 
compared with the economic and social rents they enjoy from the TVEs, the 
career of being a low-rank bureaucrat is not that attractive. In addition, this 
monitoring is bound to be weak because of the communication difficulties in 
rural areas and the fact that there are usually a large number of community-run 
TVEs, townships and villages in a county.2 
The phenomenon of"mechanism degeneration" is reported to have be-
come increasingly widespread and to be able to justify the demand for owner-
ship reform. However, this explanation cannot justify the supply-side reason 
for ownership reform. Since the TYE managers and community officials clearly 
benefit from the mechanism degeneration, why do they have incentive to give 
up their benefits and to initiate ownership reform? In order to understand the 
incentive-compatible reason for ownership reform ofTVEs, we need to exam-
ine the intertemporal asset structure ofTVEs in comparison with other owner-
ship forms. 
An Incentive Compatible Reason: Capitalization Urge 
In Table 2 we compare the debt-asset ratios between TVEs and industrial 
SOEs and among rural firms w"ith different ownership forms for 1995, when 
comparable data are available. It can be seen that township-run TVEs had the 
highest debt-assets ratio (68 percent), then industrial SOEs in second (66 per-
cent), village-run TVEs in third (55 percent). Debt-asset ratios in the private 
sector were very low, 3 5 percent for j oint-househo Ids-run finns and 25 percent 
for individual household-run firms. Although industrial SOEs are typically 
more capital intensive and have enjoyed more equity investment from the 
state, making the direct c.omparison unfair for TVEs, the comparison indiCates 
that both industrial SOEs and township-run SOEs were highly leveraged on 
average in 1995. Village-run TVEs started to have excessive debts as well. 
Data that would allow extension of Table 2 through time are not avail-
able. However, we do have such intertemporal data for an illustrative prefec-
ture-level city, Suzhou in Jiangsu Province. TVEs in Suzhou have been re-
garded as representative of the well-known Southern Jiangsu Model, in which 
all rural firms have kept pure community ownership until very recently. Table 3 
shows the rising trend of debt-asset ratio of all community-run TVEs in Suzhou. 
Tables 2 and 3 show that community-run TVEs in Suzhou had the debt-asset 
ratio of 61.9 percent in 1994, very similar to the corresponding national average 
of 62.8 in 1995. This similarity may be instructive for our understanding of the 
worsening debt burden issue of TVEs at the national level. Second, Table 3 
shows a rapid rising of debt-asset ratios from 1980 onwards. In the first half of 
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the 1980s, TVEs in Suzhou had a quite healthy debt-equity structure. However, 
along with their success and take-off over the next decade, their debt-asset 
ratios increased rapidly and have reached over 60 percent since 1992. 
In consideration of the fact that the average debt-asset ratio may cover 
the heterogeneous real debt-equity structures across finns, Sun (1999) con-
ducts a grouped comparison of debt-asset ratios and performance for 111 
surveyed township-run TVEs in Southern Jiangsu in 1995. It is found that 
there is an obvious positive correlation between the proportions ofloss-mak-
ing firms in each group and group debt-asset ratios. In the first group with 
healthy debt-asset ratios, no firms made a loss. In the groups with debt-asset 
ratios of80-90, 90-100, and over 100 percent, loss-making firms accounted for 
about 28, 43, and 52 percent of the total number ofTVEs in each group, respec-
tively. This positive correlation indicates that the firm with higher debt-asset 
ratio faces not only higher cost of debt services but also higher risks of busi-
ness failure. 
Why has the leverage state of TVEs worsened so rapidly in the late 
1980s and has it remained at so unhealthy level in the 1990s? There are two 
intuitively plausible and instructive reasons. First, the continuous entry of a 
large number ofTVEs and other type firms intensified competition, eroding the 
exceptional profits available early on. As a result, the ratio of profits after taxes 
over assets for TVEs steadily decreased from more than 30 percent in the early 
1980s to about 7.5 percent in 1995 and 1996 (Yearbook 1993: 396-397; TVE 
Yearbook 1996: 100, 1997: 122). The steadily declining profitability has signifi-
cantly reduced the capital accumulation capability of TVEs and pushed them 
to increasingly depend on credit financing. 
Second, along with the rapid expansion of community conglomerates, 
the financial capability for the community government to cross-subsidize its 
TVEs and to guarantee more loans for them has increased rapidly as well. This 
makes it feasible for TVEs to increasingly rely on debt financing. At the same 
time, information asymmetry problem becomes increasingly severe due to the 
speedily expanded scale of the community conglomerate and the accompany-
ing bureaucratization. As a consequence, individual TVEs take the advantage 
of softening budget constraint to borrow more, choose higher risk, but reduce 
their effort (Zou and Sun 1996: Proposition 1 ). 
Because the budget constraint for the community as a whole has been 
and will continue to be hard, the implication of opportunistic activities by 
individual TVEs for the community government is clear and straightforward: The 
community government ultimately bears the unlimited liability for its TVEs. 
This increasingly softening budget constraint to individual TVEs may finally 
induce the bankruptcy of the whole community. In order to get rid of the 
unlimited liability it holds for its TVEs and avoid the threat of community 
bankruptcy, the community government with many highly leveraged TVEs has 
strong incentive to initiate ownership reform program within the community. 
OWNERSHIP REFORM AND COMPETITION 61 
Table 2: 
The Comparison of Debt-Asset Ratios by Ownership, 
the end of 1995 
Industrial Township- Village- Community- Joint- Individual 
SO Es run TVEs run TVEs run TVEs households households 
Total assets 4747.21 1182.00 806.70 1988.70 156.50 568.00 
(billion yuan) 
Total debts 3123.66 803.60 446.00 1249.60 54.80 144.10 
(billion yuan) 
Debt/asset (%) 65.80 67.99 55.29 62.84 35.02 25.37 
Sources: Data for industrial SO Es are taken from "Selection from the 199 5 National Industrial Census" 
published in People 's Daily, July 25, 1998. Data for TVEs with different ownership forms are from TVE 
Yearbook, 1996: 100-101. 
Table 3: 
The Rising Debt/Asset Ratio of Community-run TVEs in 
Suzhou City, Jiangsu Province, 1980-1994 
Year Total asset• Total debt Total equityb Debt/Asset 
1980 1.71 0.64 1.08 37.17 
1982 2.47 1.02 1.46 41.15 
1983 3.10 1.27 1.83 41.04 
1984 4.62 2.34 228 50.62 
1985 6.90 3.67 3.23 5323 
1986 8.34 4.84 3.50 58.00 
1987 10.92 6.55 4.37 59.98 
1988 15.36 9.53 5.83 62.07 
1989 18.06 10.50 7.56 58.13 
1990 20.86 12.01 8.86 57.54 
1991 26.90 15.77 11.22 58.64 
1992 40.00 24.01 15.98 60.03 
1993 57.80 35.32 22.48 61.11 
1994 72.96 45.18 27.78 61.92 
Sources: Xu and Zhang (1997). 
Notes: (a) Total assets are defmed as the sum of year-end book value of fixed assets, working capital, 
incorporeal capital, and long term investment. 
(b) Total equity is held by the communities (townships or villages) and the enterprises, respectively, 
according to the sources of investment. 
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For the interest of the community government, the first purpose of the reform 
is capitalization of the community-run TVEs. In comparison with county and 
city governments, township and village governments face fewer political con-
straints: avoidance oflayoffs is not a constraint for TYEs (Sun 1999: Section 
4.2) and the community governments have constantly initiated reorganization 
and liquidation of community TVEs since the very beginning. 
Profitable TVEs have to follow the orders from the community govern-
ment to lend money in scarce to fellow TVEs with poorer performance. The 
opportunity costs of such lending is very high, because the likelihood of 
repayment is low and the lenders can use the money more efficiently. In this 
sense, they are losers ex post under the community ownership. Ex ante, if the 
probability is high that a TYE will be profitable, the perceived value of the 
cross-subsidy for this TYE will be negative (Zou and Sun 1996). Therefore the 
profitable TYE will have strong incentive to seek more autonomy, to improve 
asset structure, and to strengthen its competitive ability through ownership 
restructuring. 
Although loss-making TVEs benefit from the cross-subsidies within the 
community and from the loans guaranteed by the community government, 
they face the pressure of lowering reputation and the threat of liquidation and 
closing-down. Once the firm is closed down, both managers and workers will 
lose their non-agricultural jobs thus the sources of higher income and more 
respected social status. When the firm continues its business, the compensa-
tion for both managers and workers is typically low because the firm has to pay 
the interest and part of principals of its debt first. Therefore, the loss-making 
TYEs have strong motivation to avoid closing-down and to increase their 
equity capital through ownership restructuring. 
For TYE workers the increase of equity capital in their TYEs will 
strengthen their job security and bring them more income in terms of wage, 
bonuses, social welfare, and others. Paid subscription of shares is often imme-
diately compensated in part by the distribution of the "matching shares" (pei 
gu ). The matching shares are free of charge, in the proportion of one subscrip-
tion to one or two matching shares, and correspond to the original collective 
equity. These shares together will bring dividends in the future and the sub-
scribed shares can be transferred within the community and in some case out 
of the community. In addition, these shares bring the TYE workers certain 
control rights over their TYEs. Therefore, TYE workers who have rights to 
subscribe shares often strongly support the ownership restructuring through 
formation of joint-stock cooperatives, However the half of those workers who 
have no such rights (temporary workers from other communities) feel dissatis-
fied with such restructuring (Wang et al. 1997: 233-244). 
4. The Emergence of Joint-Stock Cooperatives in the TVE 
Sector 
The spontaneous initiations of joint-stock cooperatives (JSCs) at the 
grass-root level appeared during 1982-85 in Wenzhou (Zhejiang Province), 
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Fuyang (Anhui Province), and several other rural counties. These initial JSCs 
were typically based on joint-stock cooperation of household and small pri-
vate firms. Using the JSC as an experimental fonn for the ownership restructur-
ing ofTVEs was initiated in 1987 in Zhoucun District of Zibo City, Shangdong 
Province. However, this experimental restructuring was seriously constrained 
by the requirement that the majority of stock should be collectively held by the 
community or TVE entity 01 enneer 1996). In 1992, following the decisive push 
for renewed reform by Deng Xiaoping, the official restriction on share distribu-
tion between the collective and individuals became increasingly unpopular 
and has been gradually abandoned de facto since then. The removal of this 
restriction combined with the renewed reform impulse has led to the rapid 
expansion of JSCs (TVE Yearbook 1998, pp. 271-280; Wang et al. 1997). 
Among the diverse forms ofTVE ownership restructuring, the dominant 
one is the JSC. Table 4 reports the distribution of the forms of ownership 
restructuring in the TYE sector by the end of 1997. Nation-wide 33.5 percent of 
TVEs had restructured their ownership form by that time. Of these restructured 
TVEs, 63.37 percent adopted the form of JSCs, 12.15 percent (mainly, small 
ones) were sold to private investors, 4.66 percent were transformed into limited 
liability companies with management- or investor-ownership, 3.82 percent were 
merged into corporate groups, 1.58 percent were restructured into joint-stock 
companies (some became public companies), 0.66 percent went into bank-. 
ruptcy, and finally, 13.91 percent were leased orre-registered back to private 
ownership. 
Table 4: 
The Distribution of Ownership Restructuring Forms in 
The TVE Sector, by the end of 1997 (percent) 
Joint-stock Selling Limited Merge& Joint-stock Bankruptcy Others 
cooperative Liability Grouping company 
In 63.37 12.15 4.66 3.82 1.58 0.66 13.91 
restructed 
TVEs 
In total 21.23 4.07 1.56 1.28 0.53 0.22 4.66 
TVEs 
Sources: People's Daily, July 25, 1998. 
Notes: The data are from Ministry of Agriculture. In total, 33.50 percent of 
community-owned TVEs restructured their ownership form by the end of 1997. 
"Others" consist of mainly leasing and the re-registration of"fake" collective 
TVEs back to private ownership. 
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The dominance of JS Cs deserves the greatest research interest. Although 
there have been many local varieties of the JSC forms, which have evolved 
path-dependently and adapted to local conditions, the stylized features of 
them can be spelled out as follows. (a) Managers and employees own a major-
ity of the total share of the firm, and share-holdings among them differ on the 
basis of paid subscriptions. (b) The firm is closely held, implying that owner-
ship shares are typically not freely marketable, although subscribed shares 
can be transferred within the community. ( c) The local government may hold a 
large part of shares in the name of community citizens. That is, city and county 
governments may be shareholders of the restructured SOEs, and township 
and village governments may hold shares in the restructured TVEs. ( d) In 
addition to the shares held by the insiders and local government, there usually 
exist some (or even large) shares of outside equity which carry one vote per 
share. ( e) A representative form of governance is usually employed based on 
"one-person-one-vote" or"one-share-one-vote" or a combination ofboth voting 
principles. (f) The firm is small or medium-sized. 
The adoption of JSCs meets the urgent need for capitalization very well. 
In those provinces such as Zhejiang, Jiangsu, and Anhui, where have been the 
leading areas for TYE development, this adoption leads to an intermediate 
reduction of the debt/asset ratio by 10 percentage points at average. More 
importantly, it is widely reported that those TVEs which have transformed 
themselves into JSCs have typically shown a significant improvement in per-
formance, exhibited more dynamic features, and played the leading role in 
maintaining the TYE miracle (see, e.g., TVE yearbook 1997: 299-306, 1998: 271-
280; Han and Zhang 1993; Wang et al. 1997). 
There are typically different types of shares. One of them, for example, 
may be similar to a trust fund for employee pensions, the fund is owned by 
employees as a whole and benefits from the fund are distributed mainly ac-
cording to seniority. Shares that confer the greatest ownership rights are those 
that have been subscribed by employees as individuals, which are called the 
most active shares. However, because of the smallness of the firms, these most 
active shares are not freely marketable. It makes these individually subscribed 
shares be of more similarity to a venture capital investment with a simple profit 
sharing scheme than to the shares of Western public companies. The profit 
sharing scheme is typically that: a fixed proportion of total profits (after taxes) 
is earmarked as the shareholding fund for the distribution of dividends. 
The local government has continued to be involved in the governance 
of the restructured enterprises via its assets administration body and financial 
bureau instead of the original industrial bureaus. Its role in governance has 
been increasingly transformed from sole owner and supervisor of the firm to 
one more similar to that of a major venture capitalist. A typical venture capital-
ist often serves on the board of directors, provides help in recruiting and 
compensating key individuals, works with suppliers and customers, gets in-
volved in establishing business strategies, and most importantly plays a major 
role in raising additional capital (Admati and Pfleiderer 1994; Dasgupta and 
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Tao, 1998). At present, however, the local government seems to play a stronger 
role than a pure venture capitalist even in situations where the only capital 
provided by the government is the land. This reality may be partly attributed to 
the need by all parties concerned for more time to live up to the letter and spirit 
of their newly defined roles. But more evidence suggests that this involvement 
is mutually beneficial during the transition when well-functioning market inter-
mediaries and dispute-settling institutions are still in their infancy, and that it 
serves to promote a smooth institutional transition with lower social costs 
(Sun 1999: Chapters 2 and 4). 
The fact that managers and employees hold a majority of the shares 
makes the JSC quite similar to those firms with employee ownership. The per-
formance characteristics of employee owned fmns have been hotly debated 
and an enormous literature has developed. For the cooperative type of em-
ployee ownership and closely held employee stock ownership in developed 
economies, the theoretical and empirical literature suggests that while these 
arrangements may bring both advantages and disadvantages for the perfor-
mance of the fmn, on balance in most circumstance the disadvantages seem 
outweigh the advantages (Bonin et al. 1993 ). The recent literature dealing with 
employee ownership in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe seems to 
further alter the balance toward the disadvantages (Earle and Estrin 1996). 
The conclusions in the Western literature indicates thatthe relative scar~ 
city of worker cooperatives in the industrial sector lies in their disadvantages 
in collective decision making and capital financing (Bonin et al. 1993; Craig and 
Pencavel 1995; Hansmann 1996). Contrary to the disadvantages faced by worker 
cooperatives in the West, in China JS Cs have had much higher social trust and 
economic accountability in local communities and credit institutions than pri-
vate enterprises. Consequently, they have enjoyed significant advantages in 
capital market over private enterprises (Sun 1999; Zou and Sun 2000; Wang 
1997). With the help of the hybrid mode, Chinese JSCs can use socio-economic 
and institutional resources from more than one existing channels. They can 
develop innovative mechanisms that facilitate to avoid high costs of collective 
decision making, to check insider control, to mobilise internal financial re-
sources and to diversify risk. 
The conclusions in the transition literature rely on the implicit assump-
tion that the employee-owned firm has rents or other firm-specific surpluses in 
one way or another due to the lack of fair competition and contract enforce-
ment mechanism. This assumption is hardly applicable to the case of China's 
JSCs that have faced highly competitive product markets and increasingly 
competitive labour market, and have little political power to maintain some kind 
offmn-specific rents. 
Because of these important differences, a better understanding of how 
China's JS Cs actually work will bring new insights into not only the ongoing 
debate over the advantages and disadvantages of employee ownership, but 
also its evolving in the future. In Sun (1999: Chapter 2) four core mechanisms 
that function in the JSCs in China are examined in details. They are those that 
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check insider control, that facilitate to avoid high costs of collective decision 
making, that serve to diversify financial and business risks and thus induce 
higher financial accountability, and that provide the desirable flexibility to 
evolve. 
5. The Wenzhou Model of the Private Sector Development in 
China3 
The economic achievement ofWenzhou is most impressive among pre-
fectures in China. From 1978 to 1997, the municipal GDP increased from 1.3 
billion yuan to 60.5 billion yuan, government revenue increased from 135 mil-
lion yuan to 870 million yuan, and annual per capita income of rural residents 
increased from 113.5 yuan to 3,700 yuan. All these growth rate records are 
about double the national average and have been dominantly created by the 
private sector (Economist, May 30, 1998, p. 63; People's Daily, March 30, 
1999). 
Wenzhou is a prefecture-level municipality and located in the south-east 
corner of coastal Zhenjiang province. It has a population of seven million and 
is the most populous among Zhejiang's prefectures. Due to its mountainous 
terrain, high population density, and natural resource shortage, life based on 
only agriculture was extremely difficult as proven in the pre-reform period 
(Yuan 1987, p. 10). The high scarcity ofland had in fact stimulated "under-
ground" household workshops to conduct traditional handicrafts such as 
umbrella making, shoe making, cotton spinning, weaving, and fluffmg, and 
even production of vital materials and energy before the mid-l 970s. Since 1978, 
the development of the private sector in Wenzhou has undergone two stages 
of transformations from scattering household businesses to business affilia-
tion (guahu) with SO Es, TVEs and other corporations and from business affili-
ation to JSCs and corporations. 
From Scattering Houseltold Business to Business Affiliation 
(gualtu) 
For individual households, the development of scattered household 
business is severely constrained by their disadvantages in areas such as prod-
uct marketing, input material search, license application and approval, and 
establishment of commercial trust and reputation. For local governments, moni-
toring numerous household businesses in terms of license qualification and 
the follow-up qualification control alone would be too onerous to be practical. 
To solve these difficulties at the least cost, in addition to the popular 
practice of sub-contracting, the innovative arrangement business affiliation 
was initiated and developed in the late 1970s and 1980s. Under this arrange-
ment, household industrial and commercial firms attached themselves to an 
established collectively-owned or state-owned enterprise, paying a fee for the 
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use of its name (and thus its license and commercial reputation), stationery, 
letters of introduction, and most importantly, bank account numbers and re-
ceipt books. Taxes were collected from the established public enterprises rather 
than these attached households. In comparison with sub-contracting, busi-
ness affiliation gives more autonomy and flexibility to household firms. The 
cost is that some attached household firms have more room to undertake 
opportunistic behavior and damage the reputation of the established public 
enterprise. In both forms of sub-contracting and business affiliation, local 
governments delegate de facto monitoring rights to the established public 
firm. As a result, local governments obtained much greater administrative con-
trol over what were essentially underground firms before. Although the rel-
evant statistical data are not available, one source indicates that by the mid-
l 980s, about 62 percent of household industrial and commercial firms were 
guahu finns. In some areas the figure was as high as 90 percent (Huang 1986). 
Paralleling to the business affiliation practice of household firms, private 
finns grown beyond family-based entities largely registered as collective own-
ership with their neighborhood committee or village government as their re-
sponsible administrative body. In exchange, the administrative body collected 
a management fee and shared other benefits and control rights to a varying 
degree. This practice was known as "wearing a red hat" (dai hongmaozi) . The 
"red hat" allows these de facto private finns to avoid political risk and the 
stigma long associated with private business in China. It also brought them 
greater access to bank credits, raw materials, land, power and fuel quotas, 
contract, etc. On the other hand, local governments and officials benefited by 
being able to register, police and collect taxes and fees from this otherwise 
underground economy (Parris, 1993). 
From Business Affiliation to Joint-Stock Cooperatives and 
Corporations 
The practice of business affiliation and "wearing red hat" is a transac-
tional relationship which can be distinguished as "quasi-market contracting" 
between private firms and the administrative bodies or public firms for pur-
chasing or renting the desired institutional and social capital (Sun 1999: Sec-
tions 1.3 and 2.1 ). In the case of "business as usual", the costs of such quasi-
market contracting (including costs associated with implementing, enforcing 
and re-negotiating agreements, and protecting against third-party infringe-
ment of property rights) in terms of time, money and risk may not increase too 
much. However, in an economy with impressive growth and dynamics like 
Wenzhou, these transactional costs increase very rapidly. The established 
public enterprises become increasingly interested in predatory rent-maximiza-
tion rather than effective services. Disputes are raised typically before the 
fixed re-negotiation date by the public firm and the attached finns have to 
follow its predatory requirement due to the lock-in effect. On the other hand, 
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many attached household firms behave opportunistically to maximize their 
own profit at the cost of the business reputation of the whole group. By the 
mid-1980, products with poor quality and/or fake brand names produced by 
the business affiliation firms brought bad reputation to all Wenzhou's firms. 
As a consequence, even local governments became intolerant of, and started 
tore-organize, the business affiliation firms (Han and Zhang 1993, p. 181). 
In comparison with the business affiliation and "wearing red hat", the 
arrangement of JSCs has obvious cost-benefit advantages. The disputes over 
the issue of sharing residual benefits and residual control rights between the 
individual attached firm and its "nominal supervisor", namely the established 
public finn or institution, disappear for a JSC firm. In other words, the previous 
quasi-market contracting arrangement over residual benefits and residual con-
trol rights is now replaced by direct ownership arrangement, resulting in a 
significant reduction of transaction costs. The joint-stock form creates econo-
mies of scales in tenns of capital, production and marketing for the firm. The 
legal position of the cooperative and the significantly enlarged scale of busi-
ness bring in the much needed institutional and social trust to the firm, for 
which the firms in the affiliated relationship were having to pay a high and 
increasing price. Disputes may occur among share-holders of the firm over 
some important issues. However, the distribution ofresidual benefits is well-
defined by shares now, and the exercise of residual control rights become 
better-matched with the corresponding residual benefits rights. 
Driven by these cost-benefit advantages, the negative effects of the 
reputation collapse, and the government-promoted reorganization of the busi-
ness affiliation firms, the ownership arrangement of JSC emerged and devel-
oped much earlier in Wenzhou than in other regions. By 1990, there already 
were about 13,000 JSCs in Wnezhou. Of them, 2,325 were certified by the city 
government as having achieved the norm in terms of standardized institutional 
arrangements, accounting system, and decision-making procedures (Han and 
Zhang 1993: 185-187). In 1997, the number of JS Cs in W enzhou reached about 
43,000. Of them, about 31,000 were industrial firms, which produced about 86 
billion yuan of output, accounting for over 70 percent of the city's total indus-
trial output (Li 1997; People's Daily, March 30, 1999). 
The most distinctive feature of JSCs in Wenzhou is that about 90 percent 
of them originate from the voluntary cooperation of private and household 
enterprises, rather than from the ownership restructuring of the original collec-
tive firms (Han and Zhang 1993: 182-183 ). As a result, JSCs in Wenzhou have 
been dominated by management joint-stock ownership and employee joint-
stock ownership, in which there is no community share or collective share. The 
management joint-stock ownership makes it easy for cooperatives to trans-
form themselves into limited liability company and joint-stock company. From 
1994 to 1997, 6, 73 8 joint-stock cooperatives with management ownership re-
structured themselves into the forms of limited liability company and joint-
stock company. By 1997 there were 10,868 limited liability companies and 15 
joint-stock companies in Wenzhou (Wang and Wang 1998). At the same time, 
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in many employee-joint-stock cooperatives, the tendency of increasing share-
concentration to the core share-holders (mainly, core managers) has contin-
ued. 
Wenzhou model has shown a successful process of the private sector 
development and evolution in China. In the evolution process, all available 
capitals of the material, human, institutional and social have seemed to be 
efficiently utilized. The evolution has fitted well into the development levels of 
these capitals, particularly the gradually rising level of"knowing-how". The 
process is a typical one of"reforming from below". Although reform policy 
from above provides a favorable atmosphere for local initiatives, the radical 
extent of these initiatives and their subsequent evolution are determined by 
individuals, households, groups and government officials at the local level 
pursuing their pragmatic interests and responding to the failure of the state 
sector to meet local demands. They have managed to work the state socialist 
system to their own advantage, and to transform the existing institutions into 
market-oriented ones. 
Local governments have played a pivotal role in the evolutionary pro-
cess. They not only collude with local entrepreneurs to pursue local interests, 
but also function as an active market regulator to promote fair competition, 
technology improvement, and the establishment of the quality reputation of 
Wenzhou's products in national and international markets (Li 1997). At the 
same time they have actively inter-mediated the "chronic negotiation" be-
tween local groups and the agents of central and provincial governments to 
resolve conflicts, accommodate the changing environments, and recommend 
the new institutions and policy options (Parris 1993 ). 
6. Concluding Remarks 
Transition from a centrally planned to a market economy is one of the 
most significant economic and social events in the twentieth century. Two big 
surprises happened during the transition. The first was the sharp initial decline 
in output in most countries of former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The 
second one was China's outstanding achievement on its different path of 
transition and its own development. By maintaining nearly 10 percent average 
growth rate for two decades alongside the successful transition from a cen-
trally planned to an emerging market economy, China produced more than one-
halfofthe total GDP produced by all transition economies in 1998. China's GDP 
structure now become similar to that of Poland and the Soviet Union in the 
1980s, with the agricultural share of GDP being 18 percent in 1998 (People's 
Daily, February 26, 1999; Qian 1999). In the years to come, both China and the 
transition countries of former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe will face similar 
development challenges, in addition to the ones linked with the ongoing tran-
sition. 
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While it is widely acknowledged that the general process and sequenc-
ing of China's transition is unlikely for Russia and other Eastern European 
transition economies to follow, China's novel ways to provide positive incen-
tives, introduce hard budget constraints and promote competition have at-
tracted increasing attentions (Qian 1999; Stiglitz 1999). In China, positive in-
centives were provided not only to enterprise management and workers but 
more importantly to local governments. Competition was created not only 
among firms with various ownership forms but also among local governments 
at provincial, prefectural, city, county, township and village level. Positive 
incentives and hard budget constraints to local governments were provided or 
induced by fiscal contracting under regional decentralization, local govern-
ment ownership, and increasing monetary centralization. Competition was 
brought in through the entry and expansion of non-state enterprises, mainly 
TVEs. After first fifteen years of pragmatic reform with the emphasis on posi-
tive incentive, hardening budget constraints and competition, China came to 
set a clear goal during 1993 to 1998: to establish a rule-based market economy 
incorporating internationally recognized best practice institutions. Because 
the questions of how to install positive incentives and hard budget constraints 
to enterprises and local governments and how to introduce and promote com-
petition are still largely open in Russia and other Eastern European transition 
economies, China's experiences in these respects are relevant and instructive. 
In the specific areas such as the emergence and evolution of SMEs with 
diversified ownership forms, China's experience may be more instructive. The 
emergence and evolution of the private and community-based SMEs are mainly 
pushed by the survival urges and initiatives of individuals, households, com-
munities and grass-root institutions, and local governments at lower levels. 
Such survival urges and grass-root initiatives exist and work spontaneously 
even in a very hostile environment like one in Wenzhou in the early 1970s. In 
fact, during the transition in Russia and other former Soviet Union countries 
from 1989 to 1995 the so-called hidden economy had shown a highest growth 
rate as well. In the case of Russia, hidden economy was estimated to be equal 
to about 14 percent of official GDP in 1989. Six years later, the corresponding 
share were put by different estimate approaches to 39-71 percent, although at 
the same time, some of the hidden businesses had grown out of the hiding 
(Johnson, et al. 1997; Lacko 2000). If the society and governments can provide 
an increasingly friendly environment to the hidden businesses as did by Chi-
nese, Polish, and Czech, the hidden economy will certainly grow into formal 
one and become the engine of economic growth. 
To explore further the general implications of China's SME ownership 
evolution for SME development in Russia and other former Soviet Union 
economies, five lessons need to be highlighted. 
First, Wenzhou model may be instructive for the large hidden economy 
to grow out of the hiding, in which survival urge, innovative initiatives of 
individuals, households, communities, and local governments are the key for 
success. 
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Second, there are two key vehicles for informal SMEs to grow out of 
hiding and for general SME development: The protection and support by local 
government; and voluntary cooperation of individuals and households in the 
form of joint-stock cooperatives or joint-stock partnerships. 
Third, proper transformation of the role of governments in general and 
local governments in particular are critical for SME development. Two key 
vehicles can be identified for providing local government itself with the incen-
tive to reform: creating inter-jurisdictional competition; and changing the in-
centive structure of local government through creditable revenue-sharing and 
subsidy-reduction contracts between supervisory and subordinate level gov-
ernments. 
Fourth, although TVEs with dominant community ownership are being 
transformed in China, the TYE form may well be a plausible "next step model" 
for many of the countries where local government ownership has emerged. A 
build up of activity and experience under TYE-like forms may be desirable in 
these cases, before considering another round of ownership restructuring. 
Fifth, the ownership arrangement of joint-stock cooperatives may have 
cost-benefit advantages in other transition economies as well. The joint-stock 
form creates economies of scales in terms of capital, production and marketing 
for the firm. The cooperative structure will bring in more reliable business 
partners and a set of extended social and economic connections to the firm, 
thus increasing business security. The enlarged business scale and social/ 
economic network will bring in the much-needed institutional and social trust 
to the firm as well. 
For an individual firm, the flexibility of the ownership arrangement of 
joint-stock cooperative allow it easily to transform into a limited liability com-
pany or publicly listed stock company along with the expansion of the finn. On 
the other hand, for the majority ofSMEs, which have little chance to become an 
openly held company,joint-stock cooperatives may not be a transitional own-
ership arrangement and may be going to play a significant role in the develop-
ment of the SME sector in transition economies. 
Notes 
I . The relevant growth rates for 1992-1997 are deflated by the general retail price index. 
TYE export includes direct and indirect (e.g. in the form of subcontracting with SO Es 
and foreign companies) exports, and charges on processing for foreign firms . A large 
part of TYE export has been produced by household and private enterprises in the form 
of subcontracting with larger TVEs. Data sources in this paragraph are Statistical 
Yearbook of China (Yearbook, hereafter) 1993: 633, 1997: 587, 1998: 302; Yearbook of 
China's Township and Village Enterprises (TVE Yearbook, hereafter), 1996: 102-108, 
122-123, 1998: 107; Ministry of Agriculture, 1997; People 's Daily, February 19, 1997, 
February 5 and March 22, 1998, July 20, 1999. 
2. In 1996 each county had on average 21.2 townships, 345 .5 villages, and 723.2 
community run TVEs (Yearbook1997: 3, 21, and 399). 
3. For English publications on the Wenzhou Model, see, Liu (1992) and Parris (1993), 
among others. 
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